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INTRODUCTION
When David Gewirtz wrote that “not a single private-sector CIO
[Chief Information Officer] would be allowed to get away with
1
negligence on this massive scale,” he was referring to the failed
electronic record-keeping procedures of an entity that is considered
the highly secure base of operations for the formulation of domestic
and international policy for the United States of America: the White
2
House.
The House of Representatives of the 110th Congress learned about
the shortcomings of the e-mail archiving policies in the George W.

1. David Gewirtz, The White House E-mail Controversy: It’s Time for a Special
Prosecutor, OUTLOOKPOWER MAG., May 2008, http://www.outlookpower.com/
issuesprint/issue200805/00002168.html.
2. See, e.g., Joseph Curl, Situation Room Updated, Upgraded, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2006, at A4 (describing the White House situation room as the “most secure room in
the most secure building in the world”).
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Bush White House almost five years after the problems began.
Alarmed by the reported loss of hundreds of days’ worth of White
4
House e-mails, the House passed the Electronic Message
5
Preservation Act (“EMPA” or “H.R. 5811”) in July of 2008. This bill,
6
which the Senate did not vote on, would have tasked the Archivist of
7
the United States with issuing record-keeping standards and
certifying White House compliance with those standards in an effort
to ensure the efficient retention of publicly owned presidential
8
records. The Bush White House, despite evidence indicating that its
9
record-keeping systems were primitive, attested to the adequacy of its
record-keeping procedures. Further, the White House threatened to
veto the bill, arguing that the bill’s provisions for expanded Archivist
involvement in record-keeping policymaking would upset the
10
constitutional balance of powers.
This Comment argues that tasking the Archivist of the United
States with promulgating electronic record-keeping guidelines and
certifying presidential compliance is constitutional because the
President’s ability to perform his or her constitutional functions will
not be impaired and, additionally, because Congress has
constitutional authority to promote the important objective of

3. See infra Part II.B (discussing how Congress indirectly learned of the White
House’s inadequate archiving systems as a result of other, unrelated investigations in
early 2006 and 2007).
4. See infra Part II.B (describing an official report which revealed that the White
House lost nearly 500 days worth of e-mails due to problems with its electronic
record-keeping system).
5. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. (2008).
6. Id.
7. The Archivist of the United States is the federal officer in charge of the
National Archives and Records Administration. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (8th ed.
2004). Historian Dr. Allen Weinstein was the ninth Archivist of the United States,
and served in that role between February 16, 2005, and December 19, 2008. As of
June 28, 2009, the Acting Archivist is Adrienne Thomas. See Archivists of the United
States:
1934–Present, http://www.archives.gov/about/history/archivists/ (last
visited July 29, 2009). The Archivist plays an important role in presidential recordkeeping, as he or she has special responsibilities with regard to decisions concerning
both record disposal during the President’s term of office and also record disclosure
after the President’s term of office. See infra Part I.A (describing the role of the
Archivist under the Presidential Records Act of 1978). The Archivist is removable by
the President and there is no for-cause requirement for removal. See infra Part III.A.2
(discussing how the possibility of summary removal inherently limits the Archivist’s
license to institute record-keeping policies that the President may find
objectionable).
8. See infra Part II.C (detailing the passage of the EMPA by the House of
Representatives in July 2008).
9. See infra Part II.A (describing the Bush Administration’s record-keeping
practices).
10. See infra Part II.D (discussing the White House criticism of the EMPA).
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retaining presidential records.
Part I examines the laws and
jurisprudence that have culminated in public ownership of
presidential records. Part II discusses the Bush Administration’s
record-keeping problems, the indirect way the United States
Congress learned of the problems, and the subsequent legislative
response—the EMPA.
Finally, Part III argues that the Bush
Administration’s constitutional argument against the EMPA was
specious.
I.

RECORD-KEEPING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Legal Genesis of the Public Ownership of Presidential Records
Prior to President Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974, American
Presidents did not have reason to question their personal control
12
over the management and disposal of White House records.
President George Washington began a long tradition of private
ownership of presidential records when he bequeathed his papers to
13
his nephew, Associate Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington.
While a number of presidents enabled at least some access to their
14
papers by donating them to public libraries, others personally
ensured that the information would be inaccessible to future
15
generations of Americans.
Heirs to the records sometimes
exhibited a lack of knowledge about, or concern for, the records’
11. See infra Part III (arguing that the EMPA does not upset the constitutional
balance of powers).
12. See generally BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY, SUBVERTING OPEN GOVERNMENT: WHITE
HOUSE MATERIALS AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLITICS 10–12 (2006) (describing how
President Nixon argued that a tradition of private ownership of presidential papers
justified the agreement with Arthur F. Sampson that gave him joint control of the
materials); Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government:
The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 657–65 (2003) (proposing that the
ownership of presidential records by former chief executives was a product of a longheld assumption rather than an articulated governmental policy); Jennifer R.
Williams, Note, Beyond Nixon: The Application of the Takings Clause to the Papers of
Constitutional Officeholders, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 871, 876–82 (1993) (exploring the
common law and historical traditions of personal ownership of papers of the
officeholders in all three branches of the American government).
13. See Turley, supra note 12, at 657 (adding that President Washington’s nephew
“dispersed Washington’s papers among a wide variety of private parties”).
14. See id. at 661 (listing Presidents Hoover, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Franklin
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter as those who
bequeathed presidential materials to public libraries, but also noting that some of
them gave the materials under conditions of restricted access and use).
15. See id. at 660 (noting that Presidents Van Buren, Pierce, Grant, Garfield,
Arthur, and Coolidge ordered their records to be destroyed); see also MONTGOMERY,
supra note 12, at 11 (“The papers of William Henry Harrison, John Tyler, Zachory
Taylor, and Andrew Johnson were destroyed or partially lost in fires while in their
private possession.”).
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historical value: President Abraham Lincoln’s son disposed of at least
16
some of his father’s Civil War correspondence, and President
17
Warren Harding’s widow destroyed most of her husband’s records.
After President Nixon left office, he entered into an agreement
18
with the Administrator of General Services, Arthur Sampson, that
embodied the tradition of giving former Presidents control over the
19
20
records of their presidency.
The Nixon-Sampson Agreement
recognized the former President’s rights to the records of his tenure,
including his right to destroy White House tape recordings after a
three-year period during which the tapes could be used in court
21
proceedings.
The Nixon-Sampson Agreement elicited a negative response by
persons who questioned the customary practice of giving former
22
Presidents complete control over their records.
Advocates for
historians asked Congress to craft legislation that would make official
23
documents and presidential materials public property. These voices
were not ignored—only three months after the signing of the NixonSampson Agreement, Congress nullified the compact by passing the

16. Turley, supra note 12, at 660 & n.45.
17. Id. at 660 n.46.
18. At the time of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement, the National Archives was
under the authority of the Administrator of the General Service Administration
(“GSA”). See ROBERT M. WARNER, DIARY OF A DREAM: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, 1980–1985, at 4 (1995). Robert M. Warner, who
would later lead a more independent National Archives, described this as an illfitting arrangement, since the GSA—which, among other practical responsibilities,
oversaw the maintenance of public buildings—was neither “interested in [n]or
equipped to contribute to the cultural leadership of the nation.” Id. at 4–5.
President Nixon, perhaps recognizing this, “refused to work with the Archivist but
instead made a deal with the Administrator of the GSA to leave final control of these
records (including destruction)” to himself. Id. at 6.
19. Indeed, Sampson signed the agreement only after Attorney General William
B. Saxbe wrote a legal opinion affirming the tradition of Presidents’ personal
ownership of presidential records. See 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 1106 (1974); see also
Williams, supra note 12, at 890 (chronologizing the events related to the NixonSampson Agreement).
20. The text of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement is available in the appendix to a
district court decision from 1975. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 160–63
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding, in part, that the agreement was invalidated by the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act).
21. Id.
22. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 12, at 5–6 (detailing the criticism of the NixonSampson Agreement from various actors, including newspaper columnists, law
professors, and lawmakers such as Senator Charles Percy, who asserted, “these
documents, tapes, and other materials are rightly the property of the American
people”).
23. Id. at 11 (recounting that the National Historical Publications and Records
Commission, the Organization of American Historians, and individual actors like
M.P. Schnapper took the position that the Nixon-Sampson Agreement prevented
society from attaining a complete understanding of the Nixon presidency).
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Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (“PRMPA”).
The PRMPA kept all historically significant materials pertaining to
the Nixon Administration in the custody of the Administrator of
General Services and, importantly, banned destruction of the
25
Watergate materials pending their use in the courts.
The PRMPA tasked the Administrator of General Services with
devising regulations for the screening of the papers by executive
branch archivists, and provided the terms for future distribution of
26
the records.
The PRMPA also established the National Study
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials
(“Commission”) and directed it to consider the control, disposition,
27
and preservation of government documents.
In 1977, the
Commission recommended that all presidential papers be treated as
public property and suggested that the President be able to control
28
access to the records for up to fifteen years after leaving office.
29
The PRMPA dealt only with President Nixon’s records, and the
30
Commission’s recommendations had no binding authority.
However, with passage of the Presidential Records Act of 1978
(“PRA”), Congress authoritatively declared that the United States
would reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and
31
control of presidential records, beginning with presidential
32
documentary materials created or received after January 20, 1981.
The legislation defined a presidential record as:
24. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (2006)).
25. See Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon’s Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J.
1601, 1604 (1978) (noting that the presidential materials were to be retained in
order to preserve material for use upon a showing of “particularized need” and also
to preserve material of interest to the public for public access).
26. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (2006)).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1699 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3316–17 (2006)).
28. Turley, supra note 12, at 665 & n.80.
29. See Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 101(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1695, 1695 (1974) (codified at
44 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006)) (“[T]he Administrator shall receive, retain, or make
reasonable efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of all . . . objects and
materials which constitute the Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon,
covering the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974.”).
30. See Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1699 (1974) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3317
(2006)) (“It shall be the duty of the Commission to study problems and questions
with respect to the control, disposition, and preservation of records and documents
produced by or on behalf of Federal officials, with a view toward the development of
appropriate legislative recommendations and other recommendations regarding
appropriate rules and procedures with respect to such control, disposition, and
preservation.”).
31. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2006).
32. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2524 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2201
(2000)).
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[A document] created or received by the President, his immediate
staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President
whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of
conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or
33
ceremonial duties of the President.

Records of a purely private or non-public character, however, are
34
not reserved or retained by the United States.
The PRA does not authorize immediate disclosure of presidential
35
records to the public. Information becomes available to the public
five years after the end of a given administration, and former
Presidents may demand that the release of certain documents be
delayed for an additional seven years after the five-year period has
36
elapsed. Moreover, some documents are allowed to be withheld
indefinitely, such as national security information that has been
37
properly classified pursuant to an executive order. In January 2009,
President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13,489, which
governs the process by which presidential records are approved for
38
release to the public.
33. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (2000).
34. Id. § 2201(3). While the PRA does not enable judicial review of presidential
record-keeping practices, courts have allowed review of the guidelines that delineate
between presidential and non-presidential records. See infra Part I.C (describing
jurisprudence that addressed the possibility of judicial review of presidential recordkeeping management under the PRA).
35. Id. § 2204. See generally Turley, supra note 12, at 667–70 (discussing the PRA’s
provisions concerning the release of records after the President leaves office).
36. See 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(1)–(7) (listing the records that may be delayed for
twelve years, including: materials that may be kept secret for national security
reasons; materials concerning the appointment of federal officials; materials that are
exempted from disclosure by statute; materials that constitute confidential trade
secrets and commercial or financial information; materials that constitute
confidential communications between the President and advisors concerning
requests for advice; and materials such as private personnel and medical files).
37. See id. § 2204(c)(1) (incorporating all but one of the Freedom of Information
Act’s (“FOIA”) exemptions as provisions that allow for indefinite withholding of
presidential materials). Presidential materials that fall within the incorporated FOIA
exemptions include: national security information that has been classified pursuant
to an executive order; information that is related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency; information that Congress has statutorily exempted
from release; trade secrets and other information that would reveal privileged or
confidential commercial or financial information; information that would constitute
an invasion of privacy if released; some categories of law enforcement records;
information used by agencies responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; and information or maps concerning wells. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1)–(4), (6)–(9) (2000). The FOIA exemption that is not available for
purposes of withholding a Presidential record covers materials that constitute “interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” Id. § 552(b)(5).
38. Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009). Executive Order
13,489 explicitly revoked President Bush’s Executive Order 13,233. Compare Exec.
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The PRA also addressed the area of presidential record-keeping
management, stating that the President is responsible for
documenting his or her official acts and maintaining those
39
documents as “presidential records.” However, the President does
not have the authority to destroy records clandestinely. Whenever
the President wishes to dispose of presidential records that no longer
have administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value,
the President must notify the Archivist about the pending action and
40
obtain the Archivist’s written opinion on the matter.
If the Archivist does not object to the disposal, the President must
submit copies of the disposal schedule to Congress and wait sixty
calendar days of continuous session before destroying the
41
documents.
On the other hand, if the Archivist believes that
particular records might be of special interest to Congress or that
consultation with Congress regarding the disposal of the records is in
the public interest, then the Archivist must request the advice of four
congressional committees: the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the
House Committee on House Oversight, and the House Committee
42
on Government Operations. Otherwise, the PRA gives the President
total discretion regarding his own record-keeping management
practices and, importantly, does not endow Congress or the Archivist
43
with the power to veto presidential record-keeping decisions.
Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009) (giving an incumbent President,
but not former Presidents, authority to prohibit the Archivist from releasing
presidential records), with Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. § 815 (2002), reprinted
in 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2006) (giving the incumbent President, former Presidents,
former Vice Presidents, and their designees broad authority to deny access to
presidential documents or to delay their release indefinitely). Also in January 2009,
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 35, a bill that that would establish a process
by which incumbent and former presidents can review presidential records in order
to determine whether to assert executive privilege. This bill, if passed by the Senate
and signed by the President, would establish that the Archivist must comply with the
wishes of the incumbent President with regard to claims of executive privilege.
S. REP. NO. 111-21, at 1 (2009). However, if the current President declines to support
a former President’s privilege claim, the Archivist would delay releasing the records
for a short time to give the former President time to obtain a court order to enforce
his privilege claim. Id. at 4.
39. See 44 U.S.C § 2203(a) (2000) (directing the President to “take all such steps
as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies
that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other official or
ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are maintained
as Presidential records . . . .”).
40. See id. § 2203(c)–(e).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286–90 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that that, although the Federal Records Act authorizes the Archivist to assist agencies
in the development of records management systems, the PRA does not have an
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B. The Supreme Court’s Assessment of Presidential Records Laws
The shift to public ownership of presidential records did not go
unchallenged. President Nixon attacked the constitutionality of the
PRMPA, the predecessor to the PRA; he contended that Congress did
not have the requisite power to delegate to a subordinate officer of
the executive branch the decision whether to disclose presidential
44
materials and to prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure.
Additionally, Nixon argued that the PRMPA’s authorization of future
publication of presidential records, except where a privilege was
established, offended the presumptive confidentiality of presidential
45
communications.
When the District Court of the District of
46
Columbia dismissed Nixon’s action, the former President filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari.
The resulting 1977 Supreme Court decision in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services (“Nixon II”) directly addressed the issue
47
of control over presidential records and materials. The Court ruled,
in a 7-2 decision, that granting custody of the presidential materials
to the Administrator of General Services and permitting their
archival screening did not render the PRMPA unconstitutional on its
48
face.
The decision noted that Nixon’s argument that the Act
violated the separation of powers rested on “archaic” notions of
49
“airtight departments of government.”
The Nixon II Court also ruled that the PRMPA did not
impermissibly burden White House decision-making and therefore

analogous provision and, thus, the Archivist lacks authority to inspect the President’s
records or survey the President’s records management practices); see also Turley,
supra note 12, at 669 (observing that the PRA leaves record-keeping practices entirely
to the President’s discretion and does not expressly provide for judicial review of
record-keeping decisions).
44. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439–41 (1977).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 430.
47. Id. See generally Sandra E. Richetti, Comment, Congressional Power vis a vis the
President and Presidential Papers, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 773, 782–787 (1993–94)
(summarizing the decision in Nixon II and suggesting that the Court’s analysis could
have the effect of rendering constitutional any future regulation enacted by Congress
to control access to presidential materials).
48. See Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 425–29 (rejecting Nixon’s arguments that the PRMPA
was an unconstitutional infringement on executive branch powers). Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens issued a concurring decision, and
Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell each wrote separately, all concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote
separate dissents. Id.
49. Id. at 443 (quoting the district court, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408
F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).
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was not so at odds with executive privilege as to be unconstitutional.
The Court emphasized the fact that the executive branch remained
51
in full control of presidential materials. According to the Court, it
was reasonable to assume that Presidents expect professional
archivists, who operate within the executive branch and had
previously examined records in presidential libraries, to examine
52
their records on a confidential basis. Due to this expectation, and
because archivists had an “unblemished” record of handling
confidential materials, the Court held that the PRMPA did not
interfere with the ability of White House officials to have candid
53
conversations with the President.
The Nixon II Court did not limit its analysis to the possible
interference with presidential communications. Instead, it held that
an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress’s
constitutional authority would permit some interference with
54
executive privilege.
Since future Presidents have an interest in
accessing the records of past White House decisions, and the
American people have an interest in being able to reconstruct
history, limited interference with presidential confidentiality was
55
justifiable to protect the integrity of records. Further, Congress had
already legislated extensively in the area of regulation and mandatory
56
disclosure of executive branch documents, so the legislation’s
objective of keeping historical Nixon-era documents in the possession
of the United States was within the constitutional authority of
57
Congress.
50. Id. at 446–55. A prior case involving President Nixon, United States v. Nixon
(“Nixon I”), established the rule that Presidents and former Presidents may assert a
privilege with respect to communications made in performance of official
responsibilities and in the process of shaping the nation’s policies. 418 U.S. 683, 708
(1974). However, the existence of sufficient fundamental interests must prevail over
assertions of generalized interest in presidential privacy—and, in Nixon I, the
compelling public interest of uncovering possible criminal activities by an elected
leader prevailed over President Nixon’s interest in executive confidentiality.
Id. at 711–13.
51. See Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 444 (“It is clearly less intrusive to place custody and
screening of the materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress
or some outside agency perform the screening function.”).
52. Id. at 452.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 453 (“Congress can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss
approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by
entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested
professionals.”).
56. See id. at 445 (pointing to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act,
the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Federal Records Act as examples of
prior legislation regulating executive branch records).
57. Id.
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C. Judicial Review of Presidential Record-Keeping
Unavailable Under the PRA
The PRA does not give Congress or the Archivist veto power over
58
the President’s record-keeping management decisions. The statute,
however, does not expressly address whether presidential record59
keeping could be subject to judicial review. On review of a district
court’s refusal to dismiss a case challenging President George H.W.
60
Bush’s record-keeping practices, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Armstrong v. Bush that the
PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of presidential record61
keeping practices.
The controversy underlying the case arose in 1989 during the
transition from the Reagan Administration to the Bush
62
Administration. A group of researchers and historians filed suit to
enjoin the disposal of information contained on a White House
63
e-mail system known as the Professional Office System (“PROFS”).
The district court did not find that the PRA envisions judicial review
of presidential record-keeping practices; instead, it found that the
PRA contemplates administrative action and congressional oversight
64
as the statute’s primary enforcement mechanisms. However, the
court decided that the President’s performance of his statutory duty
to adequately document and maintain presidential records is
58. See supra Part I.A (describing the PRA’s provisions for presidential recordkeeping management, including the President’s broad discretion with regard to his
own record-keeping practices).
59. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000); see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289–91
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the PRA contains no provision that expressly precludes
judicial review).
60. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 353 (D.D.C. 1989) (concluding that
judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA is permissible under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the obligation to retain presidential
records is nondiscretionary).
61. See Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 297 (reversing the district court’s decision that the
APA authorizes judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA).
62. The Reagan administration had utilized an e-mail system known as the
Professional Office System, which allowed the deletion of communications sent over
PROFS without first printing the communications. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at
345–47. Most entities within the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) created
daily back-up tapes of communications that had not been deleted from PROFS. Id.
They kept these tapes for six weeks at the most before recycling the tapes, and
thereby losing the records contained on them. Id. The National Security Council,
also an EOP component, followed the same process, but created back-up tapes
weekly and recycled the tapes after only two weeks. Id. On January 19, 1989, Reagan
Administration officials started the presidential transition and began preparing to
dispose of the contents of the PROFS. Id.
63. See id. at 347 (asking the court additionally to direct the President and the
National Security Council to properly classify the records under either the PRA or
the Federal Records Act, and to order the Archivist to carry out his statutory duties).
64. Id. at 349.

1578

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1567
65

reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While
decisions that involve the exercise of discretionary political authority
66
are beyond APA review, the court asserted that the implementation
of records management controls is ministerial rather than
67
discretionary.
Therefore, since the “obligation to actually retain
presidential records is clear and nondiscretionary” under the PRA,
judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA was
68
permissible under the APA.
On review by the circuit court, the plaintiffs argued that the
President should be considered an agency since the APA did not
69
include the President in its list of non-agency entities. However, the
three-judge panel disagreed, citing the legislative history of the APA
and the fact that the President does not have to follow APA
rulemaking procedures when issuing executive orders as support for
the conclusion that the President is not an agency and is, therefore,
70
not subject to judicial review under the APA. The appellate court
also held that, regardless of the President’s agency status, Congress
71
did not intend to allow “outsiders” to interfere with White House
72
record-keeping practices. The court reached this conclusion after
noting that even the Archivist did not have authority to survey the
73
President’s records management practices. Thus, in overruling the
lower court, the circuit court held that judicial review of the
74
President’s record-keeping policies was precluded by the PRA.

65. Id. at 349–53.
66. Id. at 352.
67. See id. at 352–53 (stating that, because the PRA sets forth clear standards by
which to determine whether certain documents qualify as presidential records, the
President bears a nondiscretionary duty to apply those standards).
68. See id. at 353 (holding that the President’s unilateral decision to discard the
PROFS system was an exercise of discretion that does not comport with the PRA’s
disposal provisions, which set out a specific process involving the Archivist and
Congress).
69. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
70. Id. at 289.
71. Id. at 290.
72. See id. at 288 (agreeing with the appellants’ argument that even if the APA
applies to the President, the PRA precludes judicial review).
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 291. Two years later, however, the circuit court clarified that courts
may actually review the guidelines that define what records fall within the category of
“presidential records,” because the PRA does not give “the President the power to
assert sweeping authority over whatever materials he chooses to designate as
presidential records without any possibility of judicial review.” See Armstrong v.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Admin., 1 F.3d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (holding, in part, that the mere existence of paper printouts of electronic
materials did not constitute record status unless paper versions included all of the
significant material contained in electronic records).
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
INEFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES
A. The Bush Administration’s Electronic Record-Keeping Practices
From 1994 until 2002, the White House utilized the Automated
Records Management System (“ARMS”), an archiving infrastructure
75
that accompanied its Lotus Notes e-mail system. ARMS was custom
designed for the White House because, at that time, no commercial
76
“off-the-shelf” e-mail records management system existed.
This
system captured e-mail messages at the time of transmission and
77
receipt and maintained these messages in an electronic format.
ARMS enabled users to designate the status of an e-mail as either a
record or a non-record; by default, all incoming external e-mail was
marked as a record, and any messages sent by White House users who
78
did not make a designation were marked as records. Despite these
79
features, ARMS was plagued by glitches, and the Clinton White
80
House was criticized for shielding problems from public scrutiny.
In 2002, senior Bush Administration staff members decided that
the White House would switch from the Lotus Notes e-mail system to

75. See Letter from Steven McDevitt to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Pt. 1, at 4–5, (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080226143915.pdf [hereinafter Letter]
(answering questions posed by Rep. Waxman about the preservation of presidential
and federal records, writing as the former Director of Architecture and Engineering
for the White House Office of the Chief Information Officer).
76. Laton McCartney, Behind the Missing White House E-Mail,
http://www.ciozone.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1307&po
p=1&page=4&Itemid=9 (last visited July 29, 2009).
77. See Jason R. Baron, E-mail Metadata in a Post-Armstrong World (1999),
http://www.archives.gov/era/pdf/baron-email-metadata.pdf (noting that the
Clinton Administration’s Executive Office of the President instituted ARMS in order
to reduce “long-term management burdens” by “the embedding of record status
metadata”).
78. See id. (describing the mechanics of e-mail recording, or non-recording,
under ARMS).
79. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC RECORDS:
CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION’S MANAGEMENT OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S E-MAIL
SYSTEM 2, 16 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01446.pdf (finding
that the Executive Office of the President was afflicted by two separate archiving
problems—the “Mail2” and “Letter D” malfunctions—and concluding that
“[c]omputer malfunctions, ineffective systems and records management practices,
and miscommunication between EOP components led to e-mail records not being
preserved by ARMS”).
80. See McCartney, supra note 76 (mentioning that Northrop Grumman
employees working to fix the Clinton Administration’s archival system were ordered
by the White House Director of Management and Administration to maintain
“absolute silence” regarding their work, and that the Chairman of the House
Government Reform Committee chided the White House for attempting to conceal
the ARMS glitches).
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81

Microsoft Exchange. The decision to switch from Lotus Notes to
Microsoft Exchange required White House technical staff to modify
ARMS so that this archival system would operate under the new
82
system; however, both attempts to modify ARMS failed.
The White House transitioned from Lotus Notes to Microsoft
83
Exchange without instituting a records management solution.
Instead, the White House initially archived messages by manually
copying messages from Microsoft Exchange and converting them to
84
Personal Storage Table files (“.pst files”). Later, the process of
creating .pst files was “partially automated” using the program Mail
85
Attender.
By the admission of a former White House information technology
professional, reliance on .pst files as an archiving tool is a primitive
data management solution that does not correspond with
86
government standards. In 1997, the Department of Defense issued
the Design Criteria Standard for Electronic Records Management
Software Applications (“DoD Standard 5015.2-STD”), a set of baseline
functional requirements that can be applied to all government
87
records management programs.
The DoD Standard 5015.2-STD
requires that records management programs capture and
automatically store transmission and receipt data, and specifically
81. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 4 (explaining that the staffers desired to use
Microsoft’s Outlook and Exchange programs because they had been used during the
2000 Republican campaigns, they were widely used in the business community, they
integrated with the Microsoft Office programs used within the Executive Office of
the President, and because Outlook offered features that were not available in the
Lotus Notes system).
82. See id. at 6 (saying that the first attempt involved an effort to modify the
Windows XP and Microsoft Outlook interfaces to support integration with ARMS,
but failed due to “numerous technical issues”; and the second effort—using Legato
E-mailXtender to “provide a mechanism for all Outlook/Exchange e-mails to be
managed in ARMS”—did not effectively manage the volume of White House e-mail
and was abandoned).
83. See id. at 7 (saying that despite the decision to proceed with the migration,
“there was a great deal of concern about proceeding with the migration to
Outlook/Exchange without having an adequate e-mail records management solution
in place”).
84. Microsoft Outlook uses .pst files to store data. See Microsoft Help and
Support, How to Manage .pst files in Outlook 2007, in Outlook 2003, and in Outlook
2002, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/287070 (last visited July 29, 2009).
When .pst files become too large, or become corrupted, data loss is a common result.
OutlookBackup.com, PST Files, http://www.outlookbackup.com/pst-file.html
(last visited July 29, 2009).
85. Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 6.
86. See id. at 7 (“The process by which e-mail was being collected and retained
was primitive and the risk that data would be lost was high.”).
87. See generally Jason R. Baron, The PROFS Decade, in THIRTY YEARS OF ELECTRONIC
RECORDS 105, 122 (Bruce I. Ambacher ed., 2003) (discussing the genesis of DoD
Standard 5015.2-STD).
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points out that the management systems should not allow editing of
88
the messages’ metadata.
The White House’s method of manually copying .pst files, by
contrast, did not involve a mechanism that could reconcile the
messages that were retained in the .pst files and those that were
89
processed by the Microsoft Exchange server. The implication of this
deficiency is that there is no way to verify either that the archival
system contains all of the data that is passed through the server, or
90
that the records themselves are preserved in an unaltered state.
91
Additionally, the system did not track user modification of data files.
Thus, there is neither a way to verify if inappropriate modifications
took place, nor a way to determine who may have performed those
92
inappropriate activities. Unsurprisingly, it was later confirmed that
the days with fewer than normal archived White House e-mails
corresponded with the period when the manual archiving of .pst files
93
occurred.
The White House technology staff was aware of these potential
94
problems when the e-mail system migration took place. Therefore,
the Office of Architecture and Engineering and other White House
components developed a new electronic archiving system, the
Electronic
Communications
Records
Management
System
95
(“ECRMS”). Planning for the ECRMS started in November 2002
and—after years of completing requirements analyses, as well as
system configuration, testing, and tuning—the system was ready to
96
“go live” on August 21, 2006. On that date, however, White House
Chief Information Officer Theresa Payton decided not to implement
88. Baron, supra note 77, at 6.
89. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 7 (elaborating that four risks existed due to
migrating without an adequate records management system: incomplete data, lack
of data reconciliation, negative public perception, and inability to ensure user
accountability).
90. Id.
91. Id. (“The approach of simply storing e-mail message [sic] in .pst files provides
no mechanism or audit trail that tracks changes to data files or the activities
performed by users or system administrators.”).
92. Id.
93. See The National Security Archive, White House E-mail Chronology,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/chron.htm (last visited July 29,
2009) [hereinafter National Security Archive] (noting that Deputy General Counsel
of Office Administration Keith Roberts informed House Committee on Oversight
staffers of the correlation).
94. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 7 (“There was a great deal of concern about
proceeding with the migration to Outlook/Exchange without having an adequate email records management solution in place.”).
95. Letter, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 9.
96. See id. at 11 (affirming the system’s ability to handle the volume of Executive
Office of the President’s e-mails).
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the ECRMS. The reasons for this decision are unclear. Parties
interested in the preservation of presidential records criticized
99
Payton’s decision, and the White House was left without a formal
100
electronic record-keeping system.
101
National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) officials
did not play a persuasive role in the implementation of the Bush
Administration’s electronic record-keeping practices. While NARA
102
initially approved the ECRMS project in 2002, the agency’s later
involvement was largely limited to warning staffers from the Executive
Office of the President in early 2004 that the White House
“was operating at risk by not capturing and storing messages outside
103
the e-mail system.”
At least one White House information
technology professional was told to not discuss e-mail retention issues
or the analysis performed regarding missing e-mails with NARA
97. See National Security Archive, supra note 93.
98. On October 31, 2007, Payton explained that ECRMS was aborted because it
would have required eighteen months to ingest the backlog of messages from the
journal e-mail folders in the Microsoft Exchange system and also because she
claimed that the new system would not have been able to distinguish between federal
and presidential records on the one hand, and personal records on the other.
See McCartney, supra note 76. The Office of Administration, it should be noted, had
reviewed the latter issue and had ruled that it was not a concern. Id. On February
26, 2008, however, Payton cited the need for additional modifications, performance
issues, and projected costs as the bases for her cancellation of the ECRMS. Id.
99. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (questioning Payton’s reasoning
that the ECRMS should not be implemented as it would take eighteen months to
ingest backlogged messages, because the ingestion period would have concluded
before the termination of the Presidency).
100. See National Archives and Records Administration, Chronology of White
House Meetings 5, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/NARA%20
Chronology%20of%20White%20House%20Meetings.pdf (noting that, as a result of
the absence of a formal record-keeping system, the National Archives and Records
Administration will eventually receive the e-mails in “multiple formats”).
101. NARA is the successor to the National Archives and Records Service, which
had previously operated within the General Services Administration. See infra note
161 and accompanying text (highlighting the historical trend of gradually increasing
independence of the archiving function from the Executive through legislation).
NARA’s self-described mission is to:
[Serve] American democracy by safeguarding and preserving the records of
our Government, ensuring that the people can discover, use, and learn from
this documentary heritage. We ensure continuing access to the essential
documentation of the rights of American citizens and the actions of their
government. We support democracy, promote civic education, and facilitate
historical understanding of our national experience.
The National Archives and Records Administration, Vision and Mission,
http://archives.gov/about/info/mission.html (last visited July 29, 2009).
102. See McCartney, supra note 76 (listing the Office of Administration Counsel,
the White House Office of Records Management, the White House Counsel, and the
NARA as entities that reviewed and approved the ECRMS plan).
103. The National Security Archive, Summary of Jan 6, 2004, Meeting with EOP re
ECRMS at Archives II 2, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/Summary
%20of%20Jan%206,%202004%20meeting%20with%20EOP.pdf.
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104

staff and, when NARA was finally granted access on October 31,
2007, to a 2005 Office of Administration report on missing White
105
106
House e-mails, they were only allowed to review, and not copy, it.
B. Congress Learns About the White House’s Inadequate Electronic
Record-Keeping Practices Through Investigations into Unrelated Controversies
Congressional legislation relating to the White House’s electronic
record-keeping practices was crafted only after investigations into
other controversies revealed the deleterious effects of the White
House’s inadequate archiving systems. During the trial of I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald responded to the
defense’s allegations that the prosecution was withholding evidence
by disclosing that the White House had been unable to find and
produce e-mails of the Office of Vice President and Executive Office
107
of the President for a set of days in early October 2003. While this
108
admission was not heavily publicized, a subsequent, unrelated
congressional investigation into the firings of eight U.S. Attorneys in
2007 brought electronic record-keeping issues squarely into the
public consciousness.
In order to determine whether the U.S. Attorneys were fired for
political reasons, Democratic lawmakers asked the White House for
109
thousands of pages of relevant White House documents. On April
12, 2007, White House officials indicated that an indeterminate
number of e-mails—including correspondence sought in connection
with the firings—were lost because they were sent by White House
104. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 8 (relating that the Chief Information
Officer had said that the White House Counsel and White House Records
Management would answer all inquiries about records management, and that White
House information technology staffers were “not allowed to discuss the potential
e-mail retention issues” with NARA staff).
105. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the many days of
unrecorded e-mails from both the Office of the President and the Office of the
Vice President).
106. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (showing that NARA first made a
request for the Office of Administration Report on April 25, 2007, but was finally
allowed to review it on October 31, 2007).
107. See White House E-Mails Might Have Been Lost, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Feb. 2, 2006, at A2 (reporting that Special Counsel Fitzgerald wrote a letter to the
defense team saying that while he was not aware of any destroyed evidence, “we have
learned that not all e-mail . . . . was preserved through the normal archiving process
on the White House computer system”).
108. See Michael Kranish, Subpoenas Vowed Over ‘Lost’ E-Mails, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 13, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 7060143 (“The fact that e-mails are
missing was noted—but not widely and publicly noticed—in the perjury trial of
Vice President Dick Cheney’s former chief of staff, I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby.”).
109. See id. (explaining that Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a Democrat from Vermon,
and Representative Henry A. Waxman led the initial inquiry into the missing
e-mails).
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employees who were using nongovernmental accounts.
Five days
later, however, White House spokeswoman Dana Perino intimated
that there were deeper problems with the Administration’s electronic
record-keeping infrastructure, saying that “there could have been
some e-mails that were not automatically archived because of a
111
technical issue.”
Indeed, an Office of Administration report—created in 2005 but
not released to Congress or NARA until September 19 and October
112
31 of 2007, respectively —reveals that problems with the White
House’s electronic record-keeping system may have resulted in 473
days in which the e-mails for one or more White House components
were not archived, plus an additional 229 days with fewer e-mails than
113
would reasonably be expected. Additionally, the status of the backup tapes on which these missing e-mails may have actually been
preserved is contested: the White House says that the missing, nonarchived e-mails “should” be on the tapes, while other parties point
out that, by the White House’s own admission, at least 83 days worth
114
The House Oversight
of relevant back-up tapes no longer exist.
Committee has procured documents that indicate that neither the
White House’s e-mail archiving system, nor its back-up tapes, retain
any of the Office of the Vice President’s e-mails for the period
between September 30, 2003, and October 6, 2003—which is
precisely the time when the Justice Department began its
115
investigation into the Plame affair. There are also serious concerns
110. See id. (noting that the White House declared the e-mails missing only after
the Senate Judiciary Committee sought more information about the firings).
111. Press Release, Dana Perino, Press Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing
(April 16, 2007), http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2007/04/20070416-1.html.
112. National Security Archive, supra note 93.
113. See COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, EOP EXCHANGE
ENVIRONMENT—ALL COMPONENTS (2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
documents/20080227155329.pdf. Specifically, no White House Office e-mail was
archived for December 17, 20, 21 of 2003; January 9, 11, 29, of 2004; and February 1,
2, 3, 7, 8 of 2004. No Office of the Vice President e-mail was archived for September
12, 2003; October 1, 2, 3, 5 of 2003; January 29, 30, 31 of 2004; February 7, 8, 15, 16,
17 of 2005; and May 21, 22, 23 of 2005. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to
Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (Jan. 17, 2008), http://
oversight.house.gov/documents/20080117181419.pdf; see also Pete Yost, White House
Missing as Many as 225 Days of E-mail, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASH.,
Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/33804 (indicating that the
White House is seeking to recover lost e-mails dating back to August 2003, but not
the missing e-mails that were created between March 2003 and July 2003).
114. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at 21, Nat’l
Sec. Archive v. Executive Office of the President, No. 07-1577, 2009 WL 102146
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2007) (arguing that the Court should not accept the Executive
Office of the President’s unsupported claims of e-mail preservation).
115. See McCartney, supra note 76.

2009]

WHITE HOUSE RECORD-KEEPING POLICYMAKING

1585

about the current retention system’s inability to segregate federal and
presidential records, as well as its susceptibility to manual
116
tampering.
These e-mails were lost because of the White House’s failure to
117
implement adequate electronic record-keeping systems. Moreover,
these inadequacies, combined with the circuitous and indirect way
Congress learned about them, served as the impetus for new
legislation that would give the Archivist of the United States the
ability to certify whether the systems are adequate, rather than relying
118
on the chance that other investigations may reveal such problems.
C. The House of Representatives Passes the EMPA
119

On July 9, 2008, the EMPA
was passed in the House of
120
Representatives.
The bill’s sponsors designed the legislation to
modernize the requirements of both the PRA and the Federal
Records Act so that deficiencies in the electronic record-keeping
practices of the White House and federal agencies, respectively, could
121
be recognized and corrected. The Senate did not vote on the bill,
and so the EMPA died when the 110th Congress came to a close in
122
early 2009.

116. See generally Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at
12–15, National Security Archive v. Executive Office of the President, Executive
Office of the President, Office of Administration, No. 07-1577, 2009 WL 102146
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2007) (asserting that the White House’s retention system is
deficient, seeking the restoration of deleted records, and compelling the Archivist to
set forth guidelines for an adequate system to preserve federal records).
117. See generally DAVID GEWIRTZ, WHERE HAVE ALL THE E-MAILS GONE? 115–143
(2007) (finding that the White House e-mail archiving plan was “transparently
unworkable”).
118. See infra Part II.C (delineating the role and responsibilities of the Archivist
under the EMPA).
119. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. (2008). The bill was originally introduced as the
Electronic Communications Preservation Act; the title of the bill was later changed to
the Electronic Message Preservation Act in order to clarify that the legislation
applied to electronic messages rather than electronic communications. The bill
defined electronic messages as “electronic mail and other electronic messaging
systems that are used for purposes of communicating between individuals.”
H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 2 (2008).
120. See Richard Simon, House Votes to Preserve E-mails, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at
13, available at 2008 WLNR 12902408 (explaining that the bill passed by a vote of
286 to 137, and that Republican Representative Thomas M. Davis III of Virginia
criticized the Democratic leadership for focusing on this bill at a time when a
housing crisis and high gasoline prices were affecting the nation).
121. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 3–4 (2008) (summarizing the purpose of the bill
and noting that it was introduced by Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Rep. William Lacy Clay,
and Rep. Paul Hodes).
122. Rep. Paul Hodes introduced a similar bill in March 2009. H.R. 1387,
111th Cong. (2009). As of July 5, 2009, the House of Representatives has not voted
on the bill.
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In regard to presidential electronic record-keeping management,
123
the EMPA would have amended the PRA by directing the Archivist
to establish standards for the capture, management, and preservation
124
of White House e-mails and other electronic messages.
Additionally, the Archivist would have been tasked with establishing
standards for a system in which electronic messages would be readily
125
accessible for retrieval through electronic searches.
These
standards would have needed to be formulated to ensure
“economical and efficient management” of electronic records during
126
the President’s term of office.
While the Archivist would have been responsible for promulgating
record-keeping standards pursuant to the EMPA, the President would
have continued to establish and implement the actual electronic
127
records management policies. The Archivist would, however, have
certified whether the record-keeping systems established by the
President met the Archivist’s standards for the economical and
efficient capture, management, and preservation of searchable White
128
House e-mails and other electronic messages.
Pursuant to the
EMPA, certification would have taken place annually, with the
Archivist reporting on the status of the certification to both the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
129
and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Under the EMPA, the Archivist would have also reported to
Congress one year after the President’s last term in office regarding,
first, the “volume and format of presidential records deposited into

123. See supra note 7 (describing the position of the Archivist of the United
States).
124. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. § 3(b) (“The Archivist shall annually certify whether the records
management controls established by the President meet requirements under sections
2203(a) and 2206(5) of this title.” (emphasis added)).
128. Id. Generally speaking, a certification requirement is a statutory provision
that requires the President or another official to certify to Congress that a particular
state of affairs does or does not exist. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 107 (2006) (explaining that certification
requirements are often utilized “in programs involving contingent discretion, that is,
discretion that may be exercised only upon the existence or nonexistence of the
specified state of affairs”). Certification provisions have appeared in statutes since
the infancy of the nation in the late eighteenth-century; they are especially numerous
in foreign policy legislation. See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in
U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217, 221 n.16 (1999) (stating
that in 1798, for example, the President was required to certify that members and
officers of the Senate have received or will receive payments for their services).
129. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2008).
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130

that President’s Presidential archival depository,”
and second,
whether the President’s records management controls comported
131
with the record-keeping standards promulgated by the Archivist.
Importantly, all of the EMPA’s amendments to the PRA would have
132
taken effect one year after the legislation’s enactment.
D. The White House Criticizes the EMPA
Despite a record of White House electronic record-keeping
mismanagement, the Bush Administration indicated that it
“has always been committed to preserving electronic records,” and
that it does not believe that the EMPA is needed to address the
133
record-keeping management issues.
Accordingly, upon the House
of Representative’s passage of the EMPA on July 9, 2008, the
Executive Office of the President indicated that the President would
134
veto the legislation if it ever reached the Oval Office.
The White House described its opposition to the EMPA in the
language traditionally used in discussions about the constitutional
135
separation of powers. In a Statement of Administration Policy, the
136
White House first addressed the amendments to the PRA, even
though Federal Records Act (FRA) amendments were addressed first
137
in the EMPA. The White House threatened to veto the bill for the
following reasons:
The bill would amend the Presidential Records Act (PRA) in
fundamental ways that would upset the delicate separation of
powers balance that Congress established in 1978 and require the
Archivist to intrude, in an excessive and inappropriate manner,
into the activities of an incumbent President and his or her staff.
The bill would substantially alter the framework that Congress
crafted in the PRA by subjecting the President and White House
offices to requirements resembling those that the Federal Records
Act (FRA) applies to executive branch agencies. The bill would
require the Archivist to promulgate regulations that would
establish “standards necessary for the economical and efficient
management of Presidential records during the President’s term of
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Simon, supra note 120.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 5811—THE ELECTRONIC MESSAGE
PRESERVATION ACT (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/sap/110-2/saphr5811-r.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT].
135. See infra Part III.
136. STATEMENT, supra note 134.
137. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2008).
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office.” The bill does not define “economical and efficient
management,” and, therefore, would appear to provide the
Archivist with substantial leeway to establish standards that could
impose significant costs and burdens on an incumbent
Administration, which could interfere with a President’s ability to
carry out his or her constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, the bill would require the Archivist to “annually certify
whether the records management controls established by the
President meet requirements” of specific provisions in the PRA, as
well as to submit annual reports to Congress on the status of the
annual certifications. Such authority is unprecedented and would
mark a significant departure from accepted and longstanding
138
practice.

The Bush Administration concluded its Statement by expressing
dissatisfaction with the EMPA’s provisions to amend the FRA, saying
it would impose burdens on administrative agencies and curtail those
agencies’ ability to implement appropriate record-keeping
139
technologies.
Yet, in describing its opposition to the FRA
amendments, it did not cite the potential for upset to the “delicate
140
separation of powers” as it did in relation to the PRA amendments.
Considering the Bush Administration’s reaction, the question
becomes whether the EMPA’s amendments to the PRA impermissibly
upset the balance of powers as delineated by the Constitution and the
Supreme Court of the United States. Despite the Senate’s failure to
vote on the bill, the disagreement between the House and the Bush
Administration remains important for at least two reasons.
First, since the advent of e-mail, each Administration has experienced
141
e-mail retention issues. It is reasonable to presume that such issues
138. STATEMENT, supra note 134.
139. See id. (arguing, first, that “the bill’s provision requiring ‘the electronic
capture, management, and preservation’ of ‘electronic messages that are records’ is
onerous and overly broad and, in some cases, will prove counterproductive”; second,
that “the bill’s requirement that electronic messages be ‘readily accessible for
retrieval through electronic searches’ is vague”; third, that “the bill could impose
enormous unfunded costs on agencies”; fourth, that “the bill would place restrictions
on the technological approach that could be adopted”; and, finally, that
“[t]he statement that the regulations shall include such requirements [regarding
capture, management, and preservation of electronic records] ‘[t]o the extent
practicable’ does not provide sufficient clarity regarding the breadth of these
requirements and the burdens that would be imposed on agencies”).
140. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text (describing Bush
administration arguments against amending the PRA to give the Archivist
“unprecedented” authority over executive branch activities).
141. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush E-Mails May Be Secret a Bit Longer: Legal Battles,
Technical Difficulties Delay Required Transfer to Archives, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2008,
at A1 (noting that the Reagan Administration tried to order the erasure of electronic
backup tapes during Reagan’s final days in office, that George H.W. Bush “struck a
secret deal with the U.S. archivist shortly before midnight on his final day in office to
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will continue and that the legislature will look to improve oversight
over the record-keeping in the future.
Second, the Bush
Administration’s argument that this type of bill upsets the balance of
powers is bolstered by a 1984 White House memorandum written by
now-Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts that cautioned that
the Archivist’s independence from the President could raise
142
constitutional concerns. Anticipating future debates about the role
of the Archivist, this comment argues that legislation in the mold of
the EMPA is constitutionally permissible.
III. THE EMPA WOULD NOT HAVE UPSET
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF POWERS
A. The EMPA Would Not Have Placed Custody or Screening of
White House Materials Outside of the Executive Branch
The EMPA would have required the Archivist of the United States
to promulgate standards necessary for the economical and efficient
management of presidential records during the President’s term of
office, to annually certify whether the records management control
established by the President meets statutory requirements, and to
143
submit annual reports to Congress on the status of this certification.
The White House indicated that it would have vetoed the bill,
ostensibly because giving the Archivist these responsibilities would
144
undermine the balance of powers contemplated in the PRA.
seal White House e-mails,” and defects in the White House e-mail archiving system
resulted in political controversy and the expenditure of $12 million to recover the
missing e-mails from back-up tapes).
142. John G. Roberts wrote the memorandum, but it was signed by his superior,
Fred F. Fielding. Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to
Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President (May 16, 1984) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding]. It must be noted, however, that
Roberts was commenting on a draft version of the bill that created the NARA.
The memorandum found the proposed legislation troubling because the Archivist
would have been appointed for a ten-year term, without regard to political
affiliations, and solely on the basis of the professional qualifications. It also
expressed ambivalence about whether the President could actually remove the
Archivist at will. However, the bill that was signed into law removed the term
requirement. The law also explicitly gave the President power to remove the
Archivist.
The language concerning professional qualifications remained
unchanged. 44 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000). Roberts also made the separate point that,
from a policy standpoint, the legislation would make it difficult for the President to
control the Archivist because the bill increased the “stature of the Archivist” and
contributed to an “aura of professional detachment.” Memorandum from Fred F.
Fielding, supra.
143. See supra Part II.C (detailing the Archivist’s proposed duties under the
EMPA).
144. See supra Part II.D (summarizing the Bush Administration’s objections to the
EMPA).
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The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon II
provides the
analytical basis for discussions about the constitutionality of record146
keeping statutes. In that 1977 decision, the Court established that
the proper inquiry is whether such legislation prevents the executive
147
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned duties.
The Court determined that the legislation in question in Nixon II, the
PRMPA, was not unduly disruptive to the executive branch because
neither an agency outside of the executive branch nor Congress had
the power to perform the function of screening the records of former
148
President Nixon. Additionally, the Act was designed to ensure that
White House records could only be released when the release was not
149
barred by a claim of executive privilege.
A decade later, the Court added a measure of specificity to the
Nixon II test for evaluating the scope and constitutionality of
Congressional intrusion into executive branch responsibilities.
150
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held that Congress’s creation of an
independent counsel to investigate allegations of wrongdoing against
executive branch officials did not erode executive power to an
impermissible extent because the President possessed sufficient
151
control over the independent counsel.
This conclusion resulted

145. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
146. See Richetti, supra note 47, at 782–87 (characterizing Nixon II as a case
involving Congressional regulation of presidential papers and noting that the
principles underlying this decision differed from previous separation of powers cases
which had accorded the President more deference on the issue of executive
privilege).
147. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). The President, also
known as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States,” has administrative powers, clemency powers,
treaty-making powers, appointing powers, the power to fill vacancies, the power to
send messages to Congress and the power to call special sessions and adjourn
Congress, the power to receive foreign representatives, and the more general power
to faithfully execute the laws. See U.S. CONST. art. II. Commentators have noted that
the executive power is not defined in the Constitution, and thus the President can
“draw upon a vast reservoir of authority to sustain actions that defy exact
enumeration in the Constitution.” See, e.g., EDWARD F. COOKE, A DETAILED ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 62 (7th ed. 2002); cf. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 45 (5th ed. 1997) (offering the proposition that the
President’s executive powers are limited more by “the confines of political feasibility”
than by the Constitution).
148. 433 U.S. at 444–45.
149. Id. at 444.
150. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
151. Id. at 694–96. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by six other justices. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy
took no part in the case and did not give a reason for his decision to recuse himself.
See Stuart Taylor, Justice Kennedy Shuns Special Prosecutor Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1988, at A7 (hinting that Justice Kennedy may have wanted to recuse himself from a
decision that could have affected Attorney General Edwin Meese—a major player in
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from an analysis of the independent counsel’s nature and place in
152
First, the Court noted, Congress
the governmental framework.
retained no powers of control or supervision over the independent
153
counsel.
Second, Congress’s role under the Act was limited to
receiving reports or other information and oversight of the
154
Third, while the Act reduced the
independent counsel’s activities.
amount of control that the Attorney General and, by extension, the
President exercised over the investigation and prosecution of a
155
certain class of alleged criminal activity, the independent counsel
156
could nevertheless be removed for “good cause” by the Executive.
Considering the precedent set by these two cases, the EMPA passes
constitutional muster because the President would retain a sufficient
amount of authority over the electronic record-keeping process.
1. The White House would have continued to make record-keeping policy
decisions under the EMPA
Similar to the PRMPA at issue in Nixon II, the EMPA would have
placed all custody and screening of presidential materials within the
executive branch. Therefore, the EMPA comported with the
holdings in Nixon II and Morrison by not interfering with the
157
President’s ability to perform his or her constitutional duties.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that, under the EMPA, the
President and his or her staff would have continued to operate the
158
White House electronic record-keeping system. The EMPA merely
tasked the Archivist with promulgating standards for electronic
record-keeping systems that aim at ensuring that presidential
the nomination of Justice Kennedy by President Reagan—who was under
investigation by a special prosecutor himself).
152. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (analyzing the provisions of Title VI of the
Ethics in Government Act, which provided for an independent counsel who would
have the power “to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking
Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws”).
153. Id.; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1987) (holding that agents
who are removable by Congress may not be entrusted with executive powers).
154. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
155. Id. at 695–96 (“The Attorney General is not allowed to appoint the individual
of his choice; he does not determine the counsel’s jurisdiction; and his power to
remove a counsel is limited.”).
156. Id. at 696 (noting that the Attorney General’s power to remove for cause
“provides the Executive with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are ‘faithfully
executed’ by an independent counsel”).
157. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443–44 (1977) (holding that,
since the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the executive
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, it is relevant that
the PRMPA provided for “custody of the materials in officials of the Executive
Branch and that employees of that branch have access to the materials only ‘for
lawful Government use, subject to the [Administrator’s] regulations’”).
158. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a).
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electronic communications will be properly captured, managed, and
preserved, and certifying the level of presidential compliance with
159
those standards. Therefore, since the President and his staff would
remain responsible for crafting the actual White House recordkeeping controls and processes, the EMPA would have been
160
constitutionally permissible.
2. The Archivist of the United States is effectively an executive branch official
Even if it is argued that granting the Archivist the authority to issue
standards and certify presidential implementation is an impermissible
transfer of control away from the White House, the EMPA would have
passed constitutional muster under Nixon II because the Archivist is
effectively an executive branch official. The Archivist is the head of
161
the NARA, an administrative entity that is popularly referred to as
162
However, NARA does not possess the
an independent agency.
traditional characteristics of an independent agency; instead, the
structure of NARA resembles that of a more traditional executive
branch agency.
Congress designed independent administrative agencies to be
163
shielded from the unimpeded political will of the executive branch.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–2119 (2000) (establishing NARA as “an independent establishment in the
executive branch of the Government to be known as the National Archives and
Records Administration. The Administration shall be administered under the
supervision and direction of the Archivist.”). But see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J.
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies,
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236–94 (2000) (describing independent federal agencies,
but not including NARA, on a list which is meant to be inclusive).
162. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an independent
agency as “[a] federal agency, commission, or board that is not under the direction
of the executive, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor
Relations Board”). While independent agencies may not be under the direct and
obvious control of the executive, it has been widely noted that even the most
independent of independent agencies are located within the executive branch.
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 65 (1986)
(concluding that since the Constitution specifies that there are three branches of
government, independent agencies may not be considered as constituting a “fourth
branch”; rather, they must be considered as part of the executive branch); Alan B.
Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252,
252–56 (1988) (arguing that the answer to the question “how independent are
independent agencies” is “not very” because, in part, the leaders of independent
agencies are redesignated on an annual basis by the President and most independent
agencies do not have independent litigation authority separate from the Department
of Justice). Therefore, even if NARA is a truly independent agency, it is still an
executive branch agency and, thus, legislation like the EMPA is not constitutionally
impermissible.
163. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.2 (2008) (“As the
names suggest, executive agencies are designed to be responsive to the political and
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Independent agencies often have sensitive and vital responsibilities,
and so Congress intended independent agencies to interact with the
three traditional branches of government with a degree of
“‘separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity,’ so
that ‘practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
164
On the other hand, non-independent agencies are
government.’”
designed by Congress to administer statutory programs; the President
fulfills the Constitutional obligation to see that the laws are
“‘faithfully executed’ by overseeing the manner in which
165
administrative agencies carry out their statutory authority.”
Structurally, independent agencies possess certain characteristics
that serve to insulate agency decision-making from undue political
166
influence. Despite its popular reputation, however, NARA does not
possess these characteristics and, therefore, is not a traditional
independent agency.
The most salient characteristic of agency independence is the
protection provided to agency leaders against summary removal by
167
Statutory language such as “[removable only for]
the President.
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” means that the
President may not remove agency officials “without either reason or
168
explanation.”
Additionally, if the agency exercises adjudicatory
responsibilities, then courts may imply a “for cause” limitation on the
President’s ability to remove officers from the agency even if the
169
statute is silent regarding removal restrictions.
Conversely, the
President does not need to proffer any reason in order to remove
170
agency officials at non-independent agencies.
policy direction of the president, while independent agencies are somewhat
insulated from presidential control.”); see also Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1117
(noting that structural and organizational elements, along with agency traditions and
practices, contribute to independent agencies’ ability to “conduct their business
fairly and effectively while keeping them somewhat above the political fray”).
164. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.2d 759,
775 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
165. WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4.
166. See Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1135–55.
167. See id. at 1138 (noting that protection against summary removal has been,
and continues to be, the “critical criterion” by which legal academics distinguish
between independent and executive branch agencies); Paul Verkuil, Separation of
Powers, The Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 330
(1988–89) (“The condition that makes the independent agency truly independent is
a statutory restriction on removal for cause.”).
168. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1135, 1145.
169. Id. at 1146.
170. See WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4 (explaining that those executive
department heads that occupy a seat in the President’s cabinet are especially prone
to removal without cause).
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The leader of NARA, the Archivist of the United States, may be
172
removed from his office without cause, thereby inherently limiting
the Archivist’s license to institute electronic record-keeping policies
that the President may find objectionable or overly burdensome.
The President must report to Congress “the reasons for any such
173
removal,” but the absence of language that the President may only
remove the Archivist for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office indicates that summary removal is allowable. It is apparent
that Congress intended to omit this for-cause removal provision: an
early version of the Senate bill that established NARA included for174
cause removal language, but this provision was eventually removed.
Additionally, courts are not likely to imply a for-cause limitation on
the President’s removal power because the Archivist has no
175
adjudicatory duties.
The leadership structure of independent agencies is designed to
insulate agency decision-making from political influences.
Independent agencies are normally led by multi-member entities,
such as five- or seven-member boards. Typically, a leader—such as a
176
Chairman—will serve as chief executive and administrative officer.
Importantly, no more than a bare majority of agency leaders may be
177
On the other hand, a single
from the same political party.
individual, who serves at the pleasure of the president, typically heads
178
executive agencies.

171. See supra note 7. The Archivist prescribes such regulations as he or she deems
necessary to effectuate the functions of the Archivist. 44 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2000).
172. Id. § 2103(a).
173. Id. § 2103(a).
174. See Stephen H. Yuhan, The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back: Executive Order
13,233, the National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1570, 1578 n.44 (2004) (“The version of the Act initially passed by the Senate
provided for the Archivist to serve a fixed term of ten years, removable only for good
cause, see S. Rep. No. 98-373, at 23 . . . . but this section was changed by the
Conference Committee to its present form, in which the term of the Archivist is not
specified, and in which there is no ‘good cause’ requirement for removal, see H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 98-1124, at 19–20 . . . .”).
175. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1146 (referencing a case in which a court
read a limitation on the President’s removal power because the agency had an
intrinsic adjudicatory character).
176. See id. at 1165. For example, it is common for a Chairman to manage the use
and expenditure of funds as well as the appointment and supervision of employees.
Id. The Board of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, for example, will defer
to the Chairman on administrative matters; but, still, the Chairman will work
cooperatively with them on those issues. Id. at 1245–46.
177. See id. at 1137–41 (noting that there are a few exceptions to the
“bare majority” rule, as the statutes governing the National Labor Relations Board,
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission do not require political balance).
178. WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4.
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The leadership structure of NARA does not resemble that of the
traditional independent agency because most responsibility and
decision-making is vested solely in the Archivist—who is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and is not
179
protected by removal restrictions —rather than a multi-member
180
According to the statute that established NARA, the
entity.
Archivist plans, develops, and administers all programs and functions
181
of NARA.
While the Archivist must be chosen on the basis of
professional credentials rather than political affiliation, there is no
mechanism in place to balance the Archivist’s views with those of
182
other appointees. Indeed, the Deputy Archivist is not coequal with
183
the Archivist and performs the duties that the Archivist assigns him.
The Inspector General is appointed by the Archivist and reports to
184
and is under the general supervision of the Archivist.
The Archivist, thus, is effectively an executive branch official who
serves at the pleasure of the President. Not only does the White
House retain control over the implementation of electronic record185
keeping policies under the EMPA, but the Archivist, who is tasked
with issuing electronic record-keeping standards and certifying
compliance to Congress, is appointed, and can be removed, by the
President. Therefore, the Bush Administration’s contention that the
EMPA would have impermissibly infringed on the President’s ability
to perform his or her constitutional duties to execute the laws is, at
the least, an overstatement.
B. The EMPA Would Not Have Imposed an Impermissible “Chilling Effect”
on White House Communications
The EMPA directed the Archivist to promulgate standards for
186
record-keeping during the President’s term of office.
By contrast,
the PRMPA pertained to the management of records after President
179. 44 U.S.C § 2103(a) (2000).
180. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1137-38.
181. 44 U.S.C. § 2104.
182. 44 U.S.C. § 2103.
183. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(c).
184. Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8(d) (1978). The NARA Office of
Inspector General performs “audits and investigations of NARA, its contractors, and
its grantees, to promote economy and efficiency and to prevent and detect fraud,
waste, and abuse.” Office of the Inspector General, National Archives and Records
Administration, http://www.archives.gov/oig/index.html (last visited July 29, 2009).
185. See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that “the EMPA merely tasked the Archivist with
promulgating standards for electronic record-keeping systems” and that
“the President and his staff would remain responsible for crafting the actual White
House record-keeping controls and processes”).
186. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a).
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187

Nixon had left the White House. Despite this difference, the EMPA
would not have imposed burdens on the Executive that would have
limited the ability of the President and his advisers to communicate
frankly and with the expectation of confidentiality.
In Nixon II, the Supreme Court held that the PRMPA would not
188
impermissibly interfere with presidential communications.
The Court assumed that allowing archivists to screen presidential
materials after a President’s term constituted only a “very limited”
189
intrusion; moreover, it was an intrusion that Presidents and their
staffs must have anticipated considering that executive branch
personnel had previously screened records in presidential libraries,
and had compiled an “unblemished” record while handling these
190
confidential materials.
While the EMPA’s provisions related to electronic record-keeping
management during the President’s tenure, the legislation would not
have impeded the President’s ability to communicate effectively.
The EMPA would not have altered the ability of the President to
exercise his or privilege to withhold certain records from public
191
disclosure after the term of office.
Instead, the EMPA was crafted
192
Thus, a fear of
to preserve the mere existence of these records.
disrupted executive branch communications under legislation like
the EMPA should be considered specious for two reasons: first, the
EMPA would likely have decreased third-party interference with
White House communications and, second, the EMPA did not
mandate that the Archivist and his staff examine actual records, as
certification would involve only a survey of record-keeping practices.
First, the implementation of the Archivist’s electronic record
management standards should not lead to increased disclosure of
records during the President’s term of office. Rather, contemporary
electronic record-keeping systems are more likely to secure
193
communications from third-party interference. The DoD Standard
5015.2 mandates that record-keeping systems store transmission and

187. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433–36 (1977) (discussing
the provisions of the PRMPA).
188. Id. at 455.
189. Id. at 451.
190. Id. at 452.
191. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (discussing categories of
information falling into a former President’s executive privilege).
192. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 3 (2008) (“H.R. 5811 modernizes the
requirements of the Federal Records Act and the Presidential Records Act to ensure
the preservation of e-mails and other electronic messages.”).
193. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text (analyzing risks of not
implementing adequate record-keeping systems).
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receipt data and also prevent editing of the document’s metadata.
On the other hand, the Bush Administration negligently failed to
protect the security of its file servers and file directories prior to the
195
middle of 2005.
Therefore, about two thousand staff members
within the Executive Office of the President could have chosen to
clandestinely access and possibly alter the White House’s .pst files,
196
which were being used to store the Administration’s e-mails.
This possibility existed during a period, after September 11, 2001,
when the government was conducting anti-terror operations and
197
military action worldwide. Had the White House implemented an
electronic record-keeping system that complied with common
standards, the President could have given his advisers a more
198
meaningful assurance of confidentiality. It is reasonable to assume
that more intimate collaboration between the Archivist and White
House information technology professionals will lead to a more
199
secure electronic communications system, and so the EMPA would
have operated to legitimatize the President’s expectation of
confidentiality.
Secondly, the certification requirement of the EMPA would not
have necessarily involved the examination of actual presidential
200
201
records. The Archivist, who is removable by the President, would
have been tasked with annually certifying that the electronic records
management system implemented by the President is able to capture,
manage, and preserve electronic messages that are readily accessible
202
for retrieval through electronic searches.

194. JASON R. BARON, E-MAIL METADATA IN A POST-ARMSTRONG WORLD 5 (1999),
available at http://www.archives.gov/era/pdf/baron-email-metadata.pdf.
195. See supra notes 89–93 (discussing risks of failing to keep users accountable).
196. See supra notes 89–93 (noting the risks of a failure to track users’ activity).
197. See McCartney, supra note 76 (noting that many of the lost e-mails are
believed to coincide with the outset of the Iraq war).
198. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 443 U.S. 425, 448–49 (1977) (noting that
the President’s ability to give an assurance of confidentiality is a prime rationale for
the theory of executive privilege).
199. There is no reason to believe that the White House’s archiving problems
were unavoidable. See McCartney, supra note 76 (quoting Bill Tolson, director of
legal and regulatory solutions marketing at Mimosa Systems, who observed that
“[t]here never has been a technical reason [for the White House] not to have this
capability in place. Perhaps it was a matter of budgetary constraints or political foot
dragging, but technology is not an obstacle.”).
200. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting that the President sets the
actual electronic records management policies).
201. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2000).
202. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong.
§ 3(a)–(b) (2008).
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NARA officials have discussed record-keeping policies with White
203
House officials in the past, indicating that it is entirely possible to
discuss and certify record-keeping systems without discovering, or
204
divulging, records themselves.
For example, NARA collaborated
with the Office of Administration Counsel, the White House Office of
Records Management, and the White House Counsel in an effort to
205
implement the ECRMS, starting in 2002. However, these meetings
206
were not routine, and the Archivist had no authority under the PRA
to report to Congress unless the President actually communicated a
207
desire to dispose of certain records, which did not occur.
Thus, under the EMPA, it is unlikely that the Archivist would have
encountered actual presidential records. Moreover, Congress would
have learned about the White House’s record-keeping system from
the Archivist on a consistent basis, but there is reason to believe that
208
confidential communications would not have been disclosed.
This certification requirement would not have impermissibly
burdened the ability of the President to communicate frankly with his
advisors, but would only have alerted Congress to unsatisfactory
209
record-keeping practices that have gone unnoticed in the past.
203. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (explaining NARA’s initial
ties with the Executive Branch and its collaboration with Executive Branch offices on
the ECRMS plan).
204. The Supreme Court in Nixon II reasoned that the President and his advisors
could reasonably assume a level of confidentiality because archivists had amassed an
unblemished record handling presidential materials. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977).
205. See McCartney, supra note 76 (remarking that the initial draft of the Concept
of Operations for the ECRMS project was reviewed by various White House offices
and NARA).
206. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (showing that although ECRMS
was proposed in late 2001 to early 2002, the initial draft plan was not reviewed by the
numerous offices until the end of 2002 through the first half of 2003 and the final
draft plan was not reviewed until mid-2004).
207. See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)–(e) (mandating that the President must obtain the
Archivist’s approval before disposing of records and that the Archivist must consult
Congress before responding to the President’s record disposal request); see also
44 U.S.C. § 2106 (1985) (directing the Archivist to “submit to the Congress, in
January of each year and at such other times as the Archivist finds appropriate, a
report concerning the administration of functions of the Archivist, the
Administration, the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, and
the National Archives Trust Fund,” but not mentioning any authority to comment on
the President’s electronic record-keeping practices absent a disposal request).
208. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text (explaining that the EMPA’s
proposed amendments to the PRA would require the Archivist to report to Congress
regarding White House electronic record-keeping systems on an annual basis;
however, these amendments would not take effect until one year after the EMPA’s
enactment).
209. See supra Part II.B (describing the White House’s past inadequate archiving
that led to the controversies surrounding “Scooter” Libby and the termination of
eight U.S. Attorneys).
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C. Regardless of Whether Passage of the EMPA Would Have Disrupted the
Executive Branch in the Performance of Its Constitutional Duties, the Impact
Would Have Been Justified by an Overriding Need to Promote Objectives that
Fall Within Congress’s Authority
Laws are not presumptively unconstitutional merely because they
may impose limited intrusions on executive confidentiality. In Nixon
II, the Supreme Court held that the PRMPA could be upheld,
regardless of any potential intrusions, if the “impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
210
authority of Congress.”
Thus, the Court delineated two
requirements which, if satisfied, justify the intrusion: first, the
legislation’s objective must be within the constitutional authority of
Congress and, second, an overriding need to promote the objective
211
of the legislation must exist.
Regarding the first requirement, the Nixon II Court declared that
“[t]here is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and
mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the
212
Executive Branch.”
Moreover, since the decision, Congress has
declared that presidential records are the property of the United
213
This legislative declaration bolsters the Court’s prior
States.
determination in Nixon II that regulation of executive branch
214
documents is well within the constitutional authority of Congress.
The second requirement for such a law to be upheld is that an
overriding need to promote the objective of the legislation must
215
exist. On this count, the Court in Nixon II presented the argument
that unlimited deference to Presidential privilege would harmfully
216
impinge upon the decision-making of future Presidents.
Furthermore, the Court did not only waive President Nixon’s claim of
executive privilege in order to enable effective future presidential
decision-making; it also noted that the American people have an
210. 433 U.S. 425, 426 (1977).
211. Id.
212. See id. at 445 (pointing to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act,
the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Federal Records Act).
213. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000).
214. The Nixon II Court, however, did not wish to “engage in the debate”
regarding who held legal title to President Nixon’s materials. 433 U.S. at 446 n.8.
This was later definitively established by the Presidential Records Act. See H.R. REP.
NO. 95–1487, at 2 (1978) (stating explicitly that despite contentious debates about
records management procedures before and after the President’s term of office, the
idea of public ownership of presidential records was not controversial).
215. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 426.
216. Id. at 452 (“An incumbent President should not be dependent on
happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of
past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations.”).
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interest in the ability to understand the reasoning behind the
decisions of their elected leaders, and that this interest may not be
“truncated by an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only on
217
the needs of the present.”
1. Congress has the authority to issue legislation that, like the EMPA,
concerns the regulation of executive branch documents
The Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress has the authority
to issue legislation, such as the EMPA, that concerns the regulation of
218
Additionally, the EMPA, with its
executive branch documents.
provisions that would have enabled the Archivist to issue non-binding
electronic record-keeping standards and to make subsequent
219
certifications of presidential compliance to Congress, falls under
220
the investigative power with which Congress is endowed. Indeed, a
legitimate legislative purpose will be presumed when the general
subject of investigation is one in which Congress can legislate and
when the information sought might aid congressional
221
consideration. It follows, then, that the creation of legislation that
aims to investigate executive branch activities that emanate from
appropriations expenditures, such as electronic archiving of White
222
223
House records, is a permissible use of Congressional power.

217. Id. at 453.
218. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (listing examples of legislation
which have regulated the executive branch’s handling of documents).
219. See H.R. REP. NO. 110–709, at 6 (2008) (explaining that the Archivist’s duty to
annually certify would enable Congress to learn whether the management controls
put in place by the President meet the existing requirements of the Presidential
Records Act as well as the standards developed by the Archivist).
220. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not
infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.”).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D.D.C. 1959) (utilizing
the legislative purpose rule when considering the question of whether, when the
defendant Cross was recalled before the Select Committee and gave allegedly false
testimony upon which the indictment was based, the Committee propounded the
questions to the defendant Cross for the purpose of eliciting from him facts which
might aid in legislation).
222. For example, as part of the proposed budget for the fiscal year of 2009, the
White House requested $11,923,000 for continued modernization of the information
technology infrastructure within the Executive Office of the President. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APPENDIX, FISCAL YEAR 2009 1055 (2008), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy09/pdf/appendix/eop.pdf. Also, the White
House requested $8,000,000 for the costs of processing records of the departing
President and Vice President under the Presidential Records Act, transferring
records to the NARA, and paying for other transition-related administrative
expenses. Id. at 1063.
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Historically, legitimate congressional investigations have focused on
the types of executive branch activities that can be traced to
constitutional clauses giving the executive exclusive authority to act,
224
such as military action and bureaucratic administration.
The EMPA’s certification requirement, which would have tasked
the head of an administrative body with issuing electronic recordkeeping standards and then reporting back to Congress regarding
the White House’s progress towards those goals, are well within
Congress’s investigative power and did not constitute an improper
225
delegation to the Archivist.
Congress has the authority to secure
needed information relative to legislation through tools such as
registration, answers to questionnaires, congressional committees, or
through administrative bodies that exist in a manner prescribed by
226
Congress.
This certification requirement would have enabled
Congress to gain vital information about White House compliance
227
with the letter and spirit of the PRA. Importantly, this information
228
would have been received by Congress on a consistent basis, rather
229
The information
than in a piecemeal and fortuitous fashion.
provided by the Archivist would help the legislative branch determine
223. Cf. William P. Marshall, The Limits of Congress’s Authority to Investigate the
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 800–01 (2004) (describing the federal legislative
power as very broad and noting that “[e]verything the Executive does, by definition,
fits within the scope of federal authority and most can be tied to appropriations
expenditures”). It is far more difficult to obtain the authorization of both chambers
of Congress to institute an investigation—as the EMPA requires both House and
Senate approval—than it is to utilize the powers of one chamber or committee to
begin an investigation. See generally id. at 803–06 (considering the limited inherent
process constraints on the use of the congressional investigatory power).
This difficulty is evidenced by the fact that the EMPA was never voted on by the
Senate.
224. Id. at 802 nn.127 & 129 (explaining that Congress investigated the 1792
failed military expedition of General St. Clair as well as purported bureaucratic
mismanagement in the Department of the Interior and the Department of Forestry
in the 1920s).
225. See supra Part II.C (describing the enactment and substance of EMPA).
226. See United States v. Rappeport, 36 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (citing
cases that support the multiple tools Congress can use in effectuating its investigatory
powers); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 205 (1957) (“It is, of course,
not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid rules for the Congress to follow in
drafting resolutions establishing investigating committees.
That is a matter
peculiarly within the realm of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the
courts up to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected
rights of individuals is affected.”).
227. See supra notes 39–43 (explaining that, while the PRA requires the President
to keep records, the Archivist and the courts cannot review the President’s recordkeeping standards).
228. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (detailing how the EMPA requires
the Archivist to report annually to Congress on the White House’s electronic recordkeeping systems).
229. See supra Part II.B (noting how the inadequacies of the White House’s recordkeeping arose while Congress was investigating an unrelated matter).
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whether further changes to the PRA or to White House information
technology appropriation levels are necessary.
A 2002 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decision,
230
Walker v. Cheney, does not indicate that the Archivist lacks the
authority to certify the adequacy of the White House’s electronic
record-keeping practices to Congress. In that case, the court held
that the Comptroller General of the United States could not compel
231
Vice President Cheney to disclose certain documents.
However,
232
Walker was dismissed due to a lack of standing and the Court did
not decide the separation of legislative and executive powers issues
233
raised by the controversy.
Regardless, further factual distinctions
exist to disassociate Walker from consideration of the EMPA.
First, the Comptroller was seeking a right of action to obtain a
234
judicial order compelling the release of documents, while the
EMPA would have only allowed the Archivist to report to Congress on
235
the state of presidential electronic record-keeping practices.
The EMPA would have granted neither a right of action to the
236
Archivist nor the authority to examine actual records. Second, the
EMPA would have granted the authority to certify compliance with
standards to the Archivist—the leader of an executive branch
237
agency —and not an agent of Congress, such as the Comptroller
230. 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
231. See id. at 53 (dismissing plaintiff’s action and noting that no court has ever
granted an order directing the President or the Vice President to produce
information to Congress).
232. See id. at 67 (holding that the Comptroller General, as an agent for Congress,
had suffered neither the level of personal injury nor institutional injury that would
confer standing, and that even the injury to the principal, Congress, was “too vague
and amorphous to confer standing”).
233. See id. at 52–53 (explaining that while the case “engender[ed] a struggle
between the political branches,” the outcome of the case was ultimately ordained by
“equally fundamental separation of powers concerns relating to the restricted role of
the Article III courts in our constitutional system of government”).
234. Id. at 58 (“The Comptroller General filed this action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief . . . . Specifically, relying upon his authority to investigate and
evaluate under 31 U.S.C. §§ 712 and 717, and his right to obtain access to documents
under § 716, the Comptroller General requests that the Court order the
Vice President to produce documents . . . .”).
235. See supra Part II.C (outlining the limits of the Archivist’s powers under the
EMPA).
236. See supra Part II.C (explaining the distinction between the Archivist’s duty to
promulgate record-keeping standards and the President’s responsibility to
implement policies to meet those standards).
237. Regardless of whether NARA is considered to be a truly independent agency
or not, there is a great deal that distinguishes NARA from the General Accounting
Office. The General Accounting Office is an instrumentality of the United States
Government, independent of the executive departments. It was created by Congress
to be an officer that checked upon the application of funds in accordance with
appropriations and is subservient to Congress. See, e.g., Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 53.

2009]

WHITE HOUSE RECORD-KEEPING POLICYMAKING

1603

238

General.
For these reasons, Walker is irrelevant to the argument
presented herein.
Thus, Congress has authority to issue legislation regulating
executive branch documents. This role gains importance when
considering that the PRA and subsequent court decisions have made
it difficult for private litigants to challenge presidential record239
keeping practices.
Therefore, the current statutory framework
endows Congress with the sole responsibility to see that the White
House is preserving records for eventual use by other Administrations
240
and the citizens of the United States.
The EMPA’s certification
requirement would have allowed Congress to exercise this
responsibility by utilizing its investigative powers to apply political
checks on the White House by publicizing any lack of compliance
241
with the Archivist’s standards.
This type of law would enable the
early detection, or even the preemption, of electronic record-keeping

238. While the Archivist may be removed by the President without cause, the
Comptroller General is removable only by Congress. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 714–15 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller General’s role in exercising
executive functions “violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of
powers because the Comptroller General is removable only by a congressional joint
resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not retain the power of removal
over an officer performing executive powers”).
239. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Allowing judicial
review of the President’s general compliance with the Act at the behest of private
litigants would substantially upset Congress’s carefully crafted balance of presidential
control of records creation, management, and disposal during the President’s term
of office and public ownership and access to records after expiration of the
President’s term.”). But see Am. Historical Ass’n v. Peterson, 876 F. Supp. 1300, 1313
(D.D.C. 1995) (interpreting that precedent limits judicial review of Presidential
record-keeping decisions to “guidelines outlining what is and what is not a
‘Presidential record’”).
240. See Carl Bretscher, Presidential Records Act: The President and Judicial Review
Under the Records Acts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1480 (1992) (noting that the
Armstrong court decided that Congress was willing to rely on administrative
enforcement and political checks, rather than judicial review, to ensure that the
Office of the President complied with statutory record-keeping obligations applicable
to other parts of the executive branch).
241. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the value of public knowledge as a
check that both verifies and encourages good government.
Cf. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (arguing that trials should be
open because they “assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that
justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and
arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public access is essential,
therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public
confidence in the administration of justice.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976)
(noting that campaign finance disclosure requirements may serve to deter public
officials from using campaign contributions either improperly both before and after
an election).
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problems, whereas retention problems in the past have been revealed
242
only through unrelated investigations.
2. The EMPA would have addressed the overriding need to ensure the
existence of presidential records for future Administrations and for United
States citizens
The overriding need that justifies legislation like the EMPA is that
it helps to ensure that America’s future Presidents will be able to take
note of the factors and complexities that have gone into previous
243
decisions—an objective that the Nixon II Court explicitly approved.
However, without the guidance and certification of the Archivist,
various Administrations have not implemented satisfactory electronic
record-keeping systems that are able to consistently preserve and
244
segregate White House records.
Enabling the Archivist to issue standards and then certify
compliance will likely decrease the probability of subpar recordkeeping policymaking that seems to have afflicted White House
administrations in the digital age. This conclusion stems from the
knowledge that a systematic lack of collegial consultation between
information technology professionals, legal professionals, and
functional departments within an organization often results in
record-keeping systems that lack the features that enable compliance
245
with legal standards. In the case of the White House, these failures
resulted in systems that are not able to comply with statutes, such as
242. See supra Part II.B (referring to how the public became aware of the White
House’s inadequate record-keeping during an unrelated Congressional investigation
of “Scooter” Libby and the termination of eight U.S. Attorneys).
243. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452–53 & 452 n.14 (1977)
(approving the Congressional attempt to improve the “hit-or-miss” approach that
had characterized previous efforts to preserve historically important materials, and
noting the public interests served by the “rubric of preservation of an accurate and
complete historical record” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 408 F. Supp. 321,
348–49 (D.D.C. 1976))).
244. See supra Part II.A (giving a timeline of the White House’s use of problematic
document archiving systems, starting with ARMS in conjunction with the Lotus Notes
e-mail system and then the resort to manual archiving with the subsequent migration
to Microsoft Exchange).
245. This lack of collaboration has been termed “silo behavior.” See Jean-Luc
Chatelain & Daniel B. Garrie, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly of Electronic Archiving:
An Essay on the State of Enterprise Information Management, 2 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT.
90, 93 (2007) (noting that silo behavior consists of two subparts: “[t]he first, silo
thinking, results in archiving projects that lack necessary business and legal features
and functionalities because their design and implementation is largely driven by the
information technology department without sufficient collegial consultation with
functional and legal departments. The second silo implementation, results in
multiple electronic archiving implementation silos within a given corporation with
no overall enterprise-wide thinking, which multiplies asset and management costs
and increases the complexity of handling information search and retrieval”).
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the PRA and the Federal Records Act, which aim to preserve
246
important records.
The lack of meaningful collaboration regarding record-keeping
within the Bush Administration is plainly apparent when considering
the process by which the Bush White House implemented Microsoft
247
Exchange without an adequate archiving system in 2002.
While White House information technology professionals were
concerned by the rash transition from Lotus Notes to Microsoft
Exchange, it does not appear that their views were adequately
248
considered.
Moreover, NARA officials only were informed about
249
this deficiency in January of 2004. NARA officials then warned the
Executive Office of the President that it “was operating at risk by not
250
capturing and storing messages outside the email system,” but
NARA did not have express statutory authority to bring Congressional
251
Meanwhile, White House information
attention to the issue.
technology professionals in the White House were warned not to
252
speak candidly with professionals from NARA.
Finally, the
promising ECRMS system that had been under development for
almost five years was nixed at the final possible moment by the Chief
253
Information Officer for reasons that are still unclear.
A lack of meaningful collaboration during the development of
electronic record-keeping systems can lead to increased costs. If and
when record-keeping problems finally gain attention, the subsequent
record retrieval process from back-up systems is often complex and

246. Under the PRA, the President is statutorily required to retain records which
relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or
other official or ceremonial duties. See supra Part II.A.
247. See Letter, supra note 75, at 5–7 (noting that the migration from Lotus Notes
to Microsoft Exchange had started by September 2002, while planning for the
migration had begun prior to 2002).
248. See id. at 7–8 (relating that while there were meetings to discuss staff concerns
with the transition, the transition continued regardless).
249. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (emphasizing how NARA could
only recommend to the Executive Office of the President that the White House
needed to improve their record-keeping practices, but could not effectuate any
plans).
250. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
251. The record-keeping statutes indicate that the Archivist is directed to report to
Congress regarding Presidential record-keeping management decisions only when
the President has made a decision to dispose of records. See supra Part I.A.
252. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (pointing out how during the
summer of 2006, the Chief Information Officer directed an Information Specialist to
not discuss potential e-mail retention problems with NARA).
253. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text (highlighting CIO Payton’s
obscure reasons, including the time commitment required to implement the ECRMS
system to the backlog of e-mails and the system’s inability to distinguish between
federal records and presidential records).
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254

costly.
In the case of the Bush White House, for example, the
Administration asserted that complying with a court order to preserve
certain e-mails by searching individual workstations would entail
255
“significant” cost and would be “extensive and time consuming.”
More important than mere costs and burdens, a lack of
collaboration can be expected to raise the probability that future
Presidents will be prevented from accessing the desired records of
256
past Administrations.
The complete loss of historically invaluable
257
records is possible because back-up systems are not always reliable.
It is certainly reasonable to assert that future Presidents would be
hampered by the possible absence of White House e-mail records for
258
the period between March 1, 2003 and May 22, 2003 —a span of
weeks that includes the invasion of Iraq, one of the most contested
decisions the Bush Administration has made. The EMPA attempted
to preempt such losses by empowering an executive branch official to
issue standards that take into account the requirements of modern,
259
capable electronic record-keeping systems.
The American public also has an interest in the existence of
260
presidential records.
The public’s ability to understand the

254. See Chatelain & Garrie, supra note 245, at 93–94 (arguing that many decisions
in choosing between differing technologies in the archiving field focus on the
acquisition cost of the hardware, while ignoring the potentially high costs of retrieval
in the event of litigation or regulatory compliance requests).
255. See Defendants’ Responses to and Requests for Reconsideration of the First
Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff NSA’s Motion to Extend
TRO/Preservation Order at 14–15, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Washington v. Executive Office of the President, No. 07-1577, 2008 WL 2932173
(D.D.C July 29, 2008) (arguing that there is no indication that irreparable harm will
result from a decision not to conduct burdensome inspection of individual
workstations in the White House because “disaster recovery back-up tapes should
contain substantially all relevant emails” between 2003 and 2005 (emphasis added)).
256. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that future Presidents have an
interest in the existence of the records of their predecessors. See supra note 216 and
accompanying text (expressing the view that future Presidents should be guaranteed
access to all previous presidential records, instead of relying on the discretion of
their predecessors).
257. See Chatelain & Garrie, supra note 245, at 91 (noting that enterprises that
operate without implementing archiving systems often are forced to rely on media as
unsecured and unregimented as CDs or DVDs “in some employees’ desk drawers”).
258. See supra Part II.A (explaining the past and continuing inadequacies of White
House record-keeping systems).
259. See supra Part II.C (summarizing the EMPA’s expansion of the Archivist’s role
in the White House’s record-keeping practices).
260. The Presidential Records Act defined presidential records as publicly owned.
See supra Part I.A. Prior to that legislative enactment, the Supreme Court in Nixon II
had also acknowledged the public’s interest in the historical record. See Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977) (noting that the American people’s
ability to reconstruct their history should not be limited by an overly broad principle
of executive privilege).
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workings of the elected government is an interest that the Founders
262
have confirmed as legitimate and
and the Supreme Court
263
Once again, however, it is
important to a functioning democracy.
important to note the distinction between the existence and disclosure
of records. Private citizens may not be able to demand disclosure of
presidential records, as considerations of executive privilege may
264
prevent the release of certain records at certain times; however,
since the records belong to the United States, private citizens have an
265
interest in the very existence of the records. Without key portions
of this publicly-owned record, the ability to piece together and
comprehend disparate documents and e-mails will be irreparably
266
damaged.
Just as the EMPA will cater to the overriding need of
future presidents to access past presidential documents by lessening
the probability of unsatisfactory White House record-keeping
practices, it will also address citizens’ interest in the existence of a
completely documented presidency.

261. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST
TIME PRINTED, at 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1910) (“A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”); John Adams, A Dissertation on the
Canon and the Feudal Law, BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 30, 1765, available at
http://www.indiana.edu/~h105swrd/readings/H105-documents-web/week06/
Adams1765.html (writing that the people “have a right, an indisputable, unalienable,
indefeasible divine right to that most dreaded, and envied kind of knowledge,
I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers”).
262. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (noting that
“informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment”
in the course of holding that a tax abridged the freedom of the press and was, thus,
unconstitutional).
263. See generally Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 140–47 (2006) (connecting the
importance of the contemporary right of access to government information to the
guarantees of the First Amendment because those guarantees are “weak rights if
government officials withhold information necessary to a complete understanding of
the issue in controversy”).
264. See supra notes 35–38 (explaining how the PRA shields presidential records
from the public for numerous reasons, including if the records relate to national
security, trade secrets, personal medical files, or requests for advice).
265. Cf. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“We find that the
statutory language and legislative history of both [the PRA and the FRA] indicate
that one of the reasons that Congress mandated the creation and preservation of
federal and presidential records was to ensure that private researchers and historians
would have access to the documentary history of the federal government.”).
266. Cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452–53 (1977) (affirming the
interest of both future Presidents and the public to understand American history).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The White House’s rationale for threatening to veto the EMPA is
not aligned with presidential record-keeping jurisprudence.
The EMPA would not have hampered the President’s ability to
perform his or her constitutional functions because the bill did not
transfer record-keeping authority away from the executive branch.
Moreover, even if the legislation did cause limited intrusions,
Congress has constitutional authority to promote the important
objective of preserving presidential records for use by future
Administrations and the American public.
It is important to note that even though legislation like the EMPA
may be facially constitutional, it is not guaranteed to better preserve
presidential records. While the NARA’s lack of independence
enabled the EMPA to pass constitutional muster, it may also have
limited the true effectiveness of record-keeping standards and
certification carried out under the EMPA. Indeed, since the
President does not need to point to specific reasons in order to
267
dismiss the Archivist, the Archivist would have possibly been
hesitant to promulgate tough standards or make harshly critical
certifications to Congress.
The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
(“CREW”), for instance, criticized the bill because it contained
“no effective enforcement mechanisms,” leading the group to believe
that “a president [could] ignore his record keeping responsibilities
268
with impunity.” CREW recommended, instead, that the legislation
incorporate either a private right of action to challenge recordkeeping practices or noncompliance penalties. However, placing
further pressure on the President, such as enabling judicial review of
269
White House record-keeping by private litigants, may implicate the
very burdens that the EMPA so carefully avoided by keeping recordkeeping policymaking, implementation, and appraisal within the
267. The President does not have to cite inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office as reasons for dismissing the Archivist, as he or she must in
order to fire leaders of other independent agencies. See supra Part III.A.2 (arguing
that NARA resembles a traditional executive branch agency more than an
independent agency). In the case of Archivist John Carlin, who served from 1995 to
2005, the White House did not give any explanation for his ouster. See also Bruce P.
Montgomery, Their Records, Our History, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at B04 (asserting
that “Carlin’s dismissal was just the latest episode in the ongoing politicization of
NARA”).
268. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, CREW’s Analysis of
Electronic Communications Preservation Act (2008), http://www.citizensforethics.
org/files/Leg%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
269. See supra note 239 (citing the decision in Armstrong, which held that the PRA
precluded judicial review of the President’s record-keeping policies).
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executive branch. Thus, the House of Representatives crafted a bill
that would not have upset the balance of powers—but in so doing,
Congress may have denied it the sufficient muscle to overcome the
White House tradition of ineffective electronic record-keeping.

270. See supra Part III.A (arguing that despite the White House’s stance on the
EMPA, the EMPA places all White House record-keeping power within the executive
branch).

